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Summary 
The European Commission has recently presented its new framework for climate and energy policies 
for the period 2020-30. The proposal comes during a time of increased concerns over the European 
economic competitiveness. Some of the measures required to reach the 2030 targets give the 
impression that the European Union is ready to give up its strict environmental policies. We argue 
that in order to reach these targets, something the European Union certainly fails to do with respect 
to the catchy 20-20-20 strategy, a substantial revision of the core elements of the 2030 strategy is 
required. 
Introduction 
With another UN Climate Summit looming in September 2014, the European Commission 
presented its framework for climate and energy policies for the period 2020-30 on January 22, 
20141. In an attempt to regain its pioneering environmental role, despite rising CO2 emissions in 
Europe, the Commission was trying to make a point with this new framework. Some of the central 
objectives raised by the Commission are to drop binding targets for energy efficiency, keep a 27 per 
cent share of renewables binding only at the EU level and to reduce CO2 emissions by 40 per cent 
compared to 1990 levels by the year 2030. Different EU bodies are currently debating the 
Commission’s suggestions and it is expected that a final agreement will be reached in autumn 2014 
at the latest. Recent events in Ukraine have given the topic an entirely new urgency which adds a 
new twist to the decade old game between the Commission and the member states. This game 
consists of the Commission formulating ambitious targets, the member states, in the form of the 
European Council, agreeing to them, and the Council watering them down to a level where 
environmental ambition is hard to find. The Council meeting on March 20/21, 2014 however, 
seems to confirm the old gaps: some member states are devoted to serious efforts to increase the 
‘greening’ of their energy production by investing billions into sustainability and renewables, while 
others follow a simple market principle, which today favors coal over gas and renewables. Those 
who expected the summit to lead to a greater unity in terms of energy supply security have every 
reason to be disappointed. Instead of focusing on a common program to reduce dependency, 
increase supply diversity and invest in cross-country infrastructure investment, the member states 
continue to ‘talk united, but march separately’. Together with the economic crisis considerably 
slowing down energy consumption and the enormous shifts in the global gas market, triggered by 
the US shale gas revolution, the Commission’s framework needs to be interpreted in a new light. 
How plausible are the Commission’s arguments to focus on increasing energy competitiveness and 
how credible are its climate goals?  
 
 
                                                          
1 European Commission (2014): Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee of the Regions. COM(2014) 15 final. 
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Why change in policies is needed? 
The majority of stakeholders agree that current policies are suboptimal in regulating the EU energy 
market. Whereas industry, for instance Business Europe2 or Eurogas3, welcomes the Commission’s 
framework which seems to leave more leeway for the member states and for industry, others 
suggest that much stricter regulations are needed. The European Parliament calls for a binding 
target for renewables of 30% and energy efficiency improvements of 40%4. A much more radical 
change for 2030 is proposed in a Greenpeace position paper, which demands a 55% target for CO2 
emissions and a 45% target for renewables5. Giving up regulations completely, in particular 
efficiency targets, might make sense in a fully liberalized energy market – which the EU is still far 
away from achieving – because increased competition would force various energy sectors to 
develop energy efficient technologies. A premature deregulation though, might result in market 
failure carrying tremendous costs for consumers. However, the wide discrepancy across the 
suggested goals makes it necessary to look at each of the goals in more detail.  
CO2 emissions target and the ETS reform 
The Commission proposes to concentrate on one paramount goal: reducing CO2 emissions by 40% 
by 2030 and argues that this is the best solution because this policy drives increases in energy 
savings and shares of renewables6. This recommendation is justified by an increased flexibility for 
industry which allows member states to choose policies that are best suited for their respective 
energy market. Industry welcomes this simplification with a slight concern that the EU will become 
a “lone front-runner”7 ahead of the climate change negotiations in 2015 and that an agreement 
should be achieved only after the global negotiations. But instead of having protracted discussions 
about the exact target – be it 40 or 55% – the introduction of carbon pricing is the name of the 
game. 
In the new 2030 framework, the Commission also calls for a reform of the EU Emission Trading 
System (ETS). The major problem of this until now ‘polluter-friendly’ system is the current 
oversupply of allowances – around 2 billion in 20138 – due to a fixed supply system and low 
economic growth. The Commission thus suggests creating a market stability reserve in 20219 to 
address the fixed supply of allowances. As soon as the total number of allowances in circulation is 
outside a certain predefined range (400-833 million of allowances), the reserve can adjust the 
                                                          
2 In the position paper from February 24, 2014: https://www.nho.no/siteassets/nhos-filer-og-bilder/filer-og-
dokumenter/internasjonalt/nho-europanytt/businesseurope/20140227-businesseurope-innspill-til-2030-rammeverket-for-energi-
og-klima-27.02.2014.pdf Last access: 17.03.2014. 
3 In the position paper from January 22, 2014: http://www.eurogas.org/uploads/media/Eurogas_Press_Release_-
_Eurogas_2030_proposals_are_a_step_in_the_right_direction.pdf Last access: 17.03.2014. 
4 European Parliament 2014: European Parliament resolution of 5 February 2014 on a 2030 framework for climate and energy 
policies. 2013/2135(INI). Available through: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0094&language=EN&ring=A7-2014-0047 Last Access: 12.03.2014. 
5 Position paper from January 20, 2014: http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/Global/eu-unit/reports-briefings/2014/Greenpeace 
media briefing on EU Commission 2030 proposals.pdf Last access: 17.03.2014. 
6 COM(2014) 15 final (page 4). 
7 In the position paper from February 24, 2014: https://www.nho.no/siteassets/nhos-filer-og-bilder/filer-og-
dokumenter/internasjonalt/nho-europanytt/businesseurope/20140227-businesseurope-innspill-til-2030-rammeverket-for-energi-
og-klima-27.02.2014.pdf Last access: 17.03.2014. 
8 According to the European Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/index_en.htm Last access: 17.03.2014. 
9 COM(2014) 15 final (page 12). For the legislative proposal see COM(2014) 20. Accessible: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/docs/com_2014_20_en.pdf Last access: 10.03.2014. 
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annual auction volumes by adding or releasing allowances from future auction volumes. The 
mechanism of this reserve then would come close to a carbon tax.  
This reform, which is hardly discussed in the media as opposed to the CO2 emission target, is 
actually much more relevant than the CO2 emission target and will be crucial for the future 
development of the European climate and energy policies. But instead of a predefined range of 
allowances, the decision concerning the amount of allowances should be left completely to the 
discretion of the ETS reserve which should function similarly to an independent central bank, with 
an objective to prevent an oversupply of allowances. Moreover, this reform should be applied 
much sooner than 2021 in order to set long-term policies and incentives to reduce CO2.  
How realistic are such recommendations? Except for Poland, who allegedly was already 
traumatized by the 2020 goals10, the majority of the EU members seem to support the 40% target. 
However, there is less clarity about the positions regarding the ETS reform11 and its specifics12. To a 
certain degree the problem of oversupply was addressed by postponing the auctioning of 900 
million of allowances until 2019-202013 stipulated in the Regulation 176/2014 from February 2014 
(the so-called “back-loading”). This measure however, still leaves an oversupply of around one 
billion allowances during the 2013 to 2019/2020 period. Thus a substantial reform remains 
necessary and urgent.  
Renewables target 
Considered by some as the “most visible environmental achievement”14 the target on renewables is 
proposed to be kept non-binding at the level of 27%, moreover, subsidies for renewables are 
suggested to be phased out between 2020 and 203015. Some parts of industry welcome this 
“technology-neutral” approach16. This approach was lobbied for and preferred by the UK which has 
one of the lowest shares (in 2012 only 4.2%) of renewables in European comparison (see figure 1). 
France, Germany, Italy and some other member states are calling for binding renewable targets17. It 
is obvious that countries who have invested heavily in renewable energy technology during the last 
years (and created thousands of jobs thereby) want a binding target to secure future investments 
to support this sector. On the other hand it is also clear that e.g. UK, Malta and Luxemburg will have 
to undergo significant structural changes to come close to the 20 percent share by 2020.  
                                                          
10 According to Katarzyna Reiter – member of the Polish environmental ministry team during the Polish EU Presidency: 
http://www.euractiv.com/energy/uk-energy-minister-tells-tory-cl-news-533920 Last access: 17.03.2014. 
11 An overview of position papers on the auction time profile for the EU ETS to infer certain positions is available through: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/articles/0016_en.htm Last access: 17.03.2014. 
12 For a good overview of the process see a briefing by the International Emissions Trading Association: 
http://www.ieta.org/assets/3-Minute-Briefings/euets-update6november2013.pdf Last access: 17.03.2014. 
13 In the Commission’s regulation 175/2014. Available through: http://new.eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014R0176&from=EN Last access: 17.03.2014. 
14 As for example mentioned by Financial Times: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b7de8ac2-7b98-11e3-a2da-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2wETiuaNo Last access: 17.03.2014. 
15 COM(2014) 15 final (page 9). 
16 In the position paper from January 22, 2014: http://www.eurogas.org/uploads/media/Eurogas_Press_Release_-
_Eurogas_2030_proposals_are_a_step_in_the_right_direction.pdf Last access: 17.03.2014. 
17 According to an article from Euractiv: http://www.euractiv.com/energy/big-eu-guns-fire-crucial-2030-re-news-532608 Last 
access: 17.03.2014. 
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Figure 1 Share of renewables in 201218  
 
The major argument against renewables is that they are currently the most expensive way to 
reduce carbon emissions. Utilizing gas as a transition fuel could mitigate the situation. Given the 
current geopolitical insecurities surrounding Ukraine’s position as an important gas transit country, 
and the resulting geopolitical shifts between the West and Russia an even higher dependence of 
Russian gas will be difficult to sell to the European public. However, in the short term there is no 
alternative to cheap Russian gas flowing through an existing pipeline network and a state driven gas 
industry willing to invest heavily in new projects such as South Stream.  
Moreover, the alleged economic inefficiency of renewables needs to be reconsidered too. Figure 1 
and Figure 2 show that there is not necessarily any correlation to be seen between the share of 
renewables in a country and the prices of industrial consumers (however, here we do not adjust for 
subsidies that might be the cause of price differences). So for instance Sweden has high share of 
renewables but the lowest prices for industrial consumers; and Denmark has one of the highest 
shares of renewables but at the same time the highest prices for industrial consumers. The possible 
causes of this are easy to detect: Denmark (in its renewable energy mix) almost exclusively relies on 
expensive wind power19. Sweden almost exclusively relies on cheaper hydropower20. Pursuing 
renewable targets is thus not necessarily economically inefficient, it depends on the member 
state’s market and geographical conditions.  
                                                          
18 The data was obtained from Eurostat: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/energy/data/database Last access: 
March 10, 2014. 
19 Market overview in Denmark according to IRENA: 
https://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/GWEC_Denmark.pdf Last access: 19.03.2014. 
20 Policy overview according to EREC: 
http://www.erec.org/fileadmin/erec_docs/Projcet_Documents/RES2020/SWEDEN_RES_Policy_Review_Final.pdf Last access: 
19.03.2014. 
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Figure 2 Industrial Consumer Electricity Prices21  
 
Binding targets are an important signal for industry and trigger future investments to induce 
structural changes in the energy market. Without binding targets it will become more difficult to 
achieve the steady increases in the share of renewables. However, binding targets at the national 
level are politically not feasible; rather a binding 30% target at the European level should be 
introduced. This is also more than realistic since currently the EU has a 14.1% share of renewables 
at the European level22. Assuming a one percent increase every year the EU could reach a 30 per 
cent share by 2030.  
Energy efficiency target 
At the current stage the 2030 framework is the least specific about the energy efficiency target 
because the Commission is waiting for the evaluations of the Energy Efficiency Directive 
(2012/27/EU)23 which are scheduled for June 30, 201424. Nonetheless, the Commission has realized 
that having an absolute target (to consume 1474 Mtoe in 2020) as it is set out in the current 
Directive 2012/27/EU does not make much sense given the strong influence of economic 
fluctuations on energy consumption25. This can be clearly seen in Figure 3 which depicts the EU’s 
primary energy consumption over the last 25 years.  
The target could be achieved by chance if there is another economic downturn around 2020 or 
could be far away from the suggested value due to economic growth. A target which is less 
                                                          
21 Band IC: 500 MWh - 2000 MWh, Unit Kilowatt/hour. The data was obtained from Eurostat: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do Last access: March 10, 2014. 
22 According to Eurostat: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=nrg_ind_335a&lang=de Last access: 
19.03.2014. 
23 Accessible through: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:315:0001:0056:EN:PDF  Last access: 
19.03.2014. 
24 2012/27/EU Article 3. 
25 COM(2014) 15 final (page 22). 
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sensitive to economic cycles would render the energy efficiency policy much more effective. For 
example, Japan has become the most successful country when it comes to increasing energy 
efficiency by applying sector specific goals. Formulating sector specific energy efficiency goals may 
increase the complexity of the policy and make oversight more difficult. However, since the 
Commission also discusses a new governance approach, overseeing sector specific energy efficiency 
achievements should become easier.  
Figure 3 EU Primary Energy Consumption 1990-201226  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The past and the currently proposed climate and energy policies are casting doubts on their 
effectiveness. If the European Union does not want to give up a credible environmental policy, it 
should reconsider the current proposals. The following measures are suggested:  
• A well-functioning Emission Trading System (ETS) market should be ensured; 
• This would entail a reform of the current ETS sooner than 2021 (back-loading of auctions 
is not sufficient), moreover, the proposed ETS reserve should be politically independent 
and should have the discretion over the allowances supply;  
• Additionally, the renewable energy target should be binding at the European level and 
should be raised to 30%; 
• The energy efficiency goals should also remain binding until the European energy market 
is fully liberalized; moreover, energy efficiency targets should be sector specific (not the 
current absolute energy consumption target). 
The Commission’s idea that, in the future, member states should report comprehensive national 
plans27 on renewable energy, energy efficiency and greenhouse gas reduction, and not separate 
                                                          
26 Data obtained through: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/energy/data/database Last access: 
10.03.2014. 
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plans as it is currently the case (new governance structures), might help in implementing and 
overseeing these goals.   
Policy Recommendations 
1. In order to pursue environmental sustainability goals without trading off economic 
competitiveness, the European Commission should amend the currently purposed measures;  
2. Most importantly, it should ensure a well-functioning Emission Trading System (ETS). Reform of 
the current ETS is necessary before 2021. The proposed ETS reserve should be politically 
independent and have discretion over the supply of allowances;  
4. The renewable energy target should be binding at the European level and should be raised to 30 
percent; 
5. The energy efficiency goals should remain binding until the European energy market is fully 
liberalized. Energy efficiency targets should be sector specific. 
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IHS - Forschung und Ausbildung auf Spitzenniveau für Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 
 
Das Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS) ist ein unabhängiges, nicht gewinnorientiertes 
Forschungsinstitut für Ökonomie, Politikwissenschaft und Soziologie. Es ist seit seiner Gründung im 
Jahre 1963 den höchsten Qualitätsansprüchen in Forschung und postgradualer Ausbildung 
verpflichtet. Das IHS strebt in folgenden Aufgabenbereichen Höchstleistungen mit internationaler 
Ausstrahlung an: 
 
 theoretische und empirische Spitzenforschung mit wirtschafts- und gesellschaftspolitischem 
Anwendungsbezug 
 Aufbau und Förderung von Humanressourcen durch international renommierte 
Ausbildungsprogramme und Mitarbeiterentwicklung 
 wirtschafts-, sozial- und politikwissenschaftliche Beratung mit methodischem Tiefgang 
 Information der Öffentlichkeit über grundlegende Problemstellungen in Wirtschaft, Politik  
und Gesellschaft 
 
Die IHS-Standpunkte erscheinen in unregelmäßigen Abständen und greifen aktuelle Themen der 
Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik auf. Sie finden alle bisher veröffentlichten Standpunkte auf der 
Homepage des IHS unter folgendem Link:  
 
http://www.ihs.ac.at/vienna/Mediacorner/Press-1/IHS-Standpunkt---Position.htm 
 
Wir freuen uns, wenn Sie Initiativen am IHS unterstützen und das Institut weiterempfehlen. Mehr 
Informationen finden Sie auf www.ihs.ac.at. Wenn Sie die Standpunkte laufend beziehen oder 
abbestellen wollen, wenden Sie sich an communication@ihs.ac.at. 
 
 
